rom the U.S. Dept. of State, May 21,
2004: Due to ongoing security concerns, the Department urges
Americans to consider carefully the risks of travel to Kenya at
this time. ... The U.S. Government continues to receive indications
of terrorist threats in the region. ... "
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge on the "Today" show,
May 26, 2004: "There is a continuing stream of intelligence that
talks about the possibility of attacks [on the U.S.]. ... There is
reason to be concerned. ... We operate under the notion that there
are terror cells here."
I should note that Ridge's quotes above are taken out of context
-- or at least, the context he was trying to create. He wanted to
convey that there's always a threat of terrorism, that the
government is vigilant and there are continuous improvements in
security. When asked why the government wasn't elevating the threat
level, Ridge said there's "no need to put the entire country on
national alert."
Ridge knows there are consequences to officially sounding an
alarm. If the alarm is too shrill, people become more wary than
circumstances demand. And if warnings are prolonged, people become
complacent.
Warnings about travel to Kenya may offer a case study for both
undesirable outcomes.
In 2002, a bomb went off outside a hotel in Mombasa, and a
missile was fired at an Israeli airplane. The State Dept. initially
reacted with only a "public announcement," a format used to
"disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats." Six
months later, in May 2003, the State Dept. replaced the public
announcement with a sterner "warning" against nonessential travel
to Kenya.
This month, that language was lightened, as quoted at the
beginning of this article. Interestingly, the actual bombing --
which, remember, occurred six months prior to the issuance of the
first State Dept. warning -- had not slowed Kenya's post-9/11
recovery. In fact, tourism arrivals in 2003 after the bombing but
before the warning grew 22% over 2002. After the warning, however,
arrivals for the balance of the year fell 42% below 2002
levels.
However, Dennis Pinto, managing director of Micato Safaris, said
Kenya is having "a banner year" in 2004, and that the bookings
started coming well before the warning language changed.
Did Americans decide on their own that it was safe? Or have they
simply become complacent, concluding that when many places present
a risk, why worry about a specific warning?
There may be no difference in the terrorist threat in New York
and Nairobi, for example -- Ridge's language certainly doesn't
define a difference. And that may be why some tourist boards charge
that warnings are unevenly applied to Western countries vs.
developing nations.
Why, for instance, does Kenya have a warning and Spain only a
public announcement? Maisa Fernandez of the Kenya Tourist Board,
said that U.S. officials told her only that "there are bad people
living in Kenya," a charge Ridge admits is true of the U.S., as
well.
In an era when U.S. officials are accused of not doing
everything possible to prevent terrorism, they understandably want
a paper trail of warnings. But this is also an era when the U.S.
should not issue warnings that may cripple the tourism industry of
a potential ally, particularly when the U.S. shows it's too queasy
to issue such a warning about itself when it's under similar
conditions.