Look Again is the first in an occasional series of reports that
will take a "second look" at the news.
WASHINGTON -- Travelocity.com and Expedia.com, the Web's two largest sellers of
travel, sold over $900 million in travel during the first quarter,
and reported losses of over $107 million in the process.
You can look it up, because, for the first time, both companies
are publicly traded and are publishing their quarterly earnings
reports. We knew all along they were losing money, but now, we get
to see how much. We get to keep score.
Or do we?
The financial statements show a net loss of $40.7 million for
Travelocity and $66.5 million for Expedia, but the bottom lines are
muddied by special circumstances and accounting conventions.
Each was involved in an acquisition in the first quarter --
Travelocity acquired Preview Travel, and Expedia acquired
Travelscape and VacationSpot. Thus, to avoid apples-and-oranges
comparisons with prior reporting periods, they followed the
standard practice of restating the numbers as if the acquisitions
had occurred at the start of 1999.
This produces a "pro forma" statement that makes it easier for
investors to chart a company's progress, but it also produces a
boilerplate warning that the numbers "may not be indicative of
actual results."
In addition, each was affected by one-time charges and noncash
deductions.
But before we take a closer look at the financial reports, we
can sum things up in terms a travel agent can understand: If the
Big Two, selling $900 million in travel, had been working on a
straight 10% commission, they still would have lost money.
Brutal Economics
If you think the economics of running a brick-and-mortar travel
agency are brutal, take a look at Travelocity's first quarter
statement, which reflects the combined results of Travelocity and
Preview Travel.
During the quarter, Travelocity and Preview handled just over
1.83 million transactions at an average price of $275.42, at an
average remuneration of about $16.25 per transaction.
Sales rose 146% over the same quarter of 1999, to $504.3
million, but the revenue from those sales (commissions and fees)
rose by a smaller amount, 133%, totaling $29.8 million, or 5.9% of
sales. Revenue from advertising and other sources contributed $5.9
million, producing total revenue of $35.7 million.
From this figure, Travelocity deducted direct "cost of revenues"
of $15.9 million, leaving a "gross profit" of $19.8 million. But
that's before expenses.
Travelocity spent $24.4 million on marketing and $5.2 million on
technology and development.
Alert readers will note that we haven't gotten to the bottom
line yet, and the $35.7 million in revenue is worse than gone.
In addition to these and other cash operating expenses,
Travelocity had to deduct $2.4 million to reflect the value of
employee stock compensation, and $22 million for the "amortization
of intangibles" relating to the merger with Preview. That turns the
$35.7 million in revenue into an operating loss of $41.3 million.
After provision for interest and income taxes, Travelocity reported
a net loss of $40.7 million.
Travelocity's news release called it a "strong" performance.
No matter how you slice it, one thing is clear: Travelocity
isn't making nearly enough in transaction fees and commissions to
cover its costs. Revenue from travel bookings came to 5.9% of
sales, and as Travel Weekly's readers will understand, it takes an
exceptional agency to make a profit on a 6% commission, especially
if you are spending two-thirds of your revenue on marketing.
Small wonder that Travelocity president Terrell Jones has been
quoted extensively of late about his plans for moving more
high-yield products such as cruises and tours. Evidently, selling
cheap seats in cyberspace is, for Travelocity at least, no more
remunerative than selling cheap seats in a brick-and-mortar
agency.
Similar Story
Expedia's first quarter report tells a similar story. Combining
its results with those of Travelscape and VacationSpot, the
Microsoft spin-off reported 897,000 commissionable transactions, at
an average value of $401.34, at an average remuneration of about
$20 a pop.
Overall sales increased 178% to $401 million. Of that total,
$360 million was recorded as "agency" sales, for which Expedia
earned commissions and fees of $17.8 million, for an effective
commission rate of 4.9%.
The remaining $41 million in sales came from 125,000
transactions that Expedia describes as wholesale or "merchant
transactions," where the company negotiates net rates with
suppliers and adds a mark-up for retail sale or auction. The
company records as revenue "the full gross booking value" of such
sales, but only in the quarter when the trip occurs, which wrecks
any direct comparison with Travelocity.
Expedia reported total revenue of $58.8 million, which includes
$34 million in net revenue from its merchant transactions and $6.9
million from advertising, licensing and other activities.
From this revenue pie, Expedia took out $37.5 million in direct
"cost of revenues," plus a $4.1 million one-time adjustment,
leaving a "gross profit," before expenses, of $17.2 million. From
this number, Expedia, like its rival, had to deduct operating
expenses that quickly put the company in the red.
Marketing and sales came to $29.8 million. Product development
took another $5.9 million.
Expedia also had to deduct for stock-based compensation ($29.7
million) and the amortization of intangibles relating to its
acquisitions ($15.5 million). That took the operating loss to $67.3
million and the net loss to $66.5 million.
As with Travelocity, a glaring fact about commissions stands out
in the Expedia report: 90% of Expedia's sales in the first quarter,
or $360 million, were conducted on a traditional travel agency
model, and produced commissions and fees of $17.8 million, a paltry
4.9% of sales. Regardless of what kind markup it enjoyed on the
remaining $41 million in "merchant" sales, this is not a formula
for quick profits if the company elects to spend $30 million on
marketing.
It is no accident that Expedia has high hopes for reducing its
reliance on traditional agency business and expanding the role of
its "merchant" sales.
According to the new rules of the Web, marketing for market
share comes first, managing for profits come later. Before their
shares were publicly traded, Travelocity and Expedia seldom talked
about what they needed to do to be profitable.
But that appears to be changing. Both are now talking about some
of the same things that all agents are doing: cutting costs and
eliminating redundancies, reducing their dependence on low-yield
air transactions, increasing their reliance on higher-yielding
products, and attracting repeat business through better customer
service, including personal service where appropriate.
Except for the awful bigness of the numbers, perhaps selling
travel on the Web is not so different, after all, from just selling
travel.
First-quarter results
(in millions)
Travelocity outperforms Expedia in total sales
TRAVELOCITYEXPEDIA
Agency Sales
$504.3
$360.0
Merchant Sales
n/a
$41.0
Total Sales
$504.3
$401.0
Transaction
Revenue
$29.8
$17.8
T.R. as Percent of
Sales
5.9%
4.9%
Merchant Revenue
n/a
$34.0
Other Revenue
$5.9
$6.9
Total Revenue
$35.7
$58.8
Cost of Revenue
$15.9
$41.5
Gross Profit
$19.8
$17.2
Operating
Costs/Marketing & Sales
$24.4
$29.8
Operating Costs/Tech.
Development
$5.2
$5.9
Operating
Costs/General & Admin.
$5.4
$3.6
Operating
Costs/Merger Related
$1.6
n/a
Operating Costs/Stock
Compensation
$2.4
$29.7
Operating
Costs/Amortization
$22.1
$15.5
Total Operating
Costs
$61.1
$84.5
Operating Loss
Before
Amortization & Stock Compensation
$16.8
$22.1
Operating Loss
$41.3
$67.3
Net Loss
$40.7
$66.5